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Abstract.  Contactless card payments are being introduced around the world allowing 
customers to use a card to pay for small purchases by simply placing the card onto the 
Point of Sale terminal.  Contactless transactions do not require verification of the card-
holder’s PIN.  However our research has found the redundant verify PIN functionality 
is present on the most commonly issued contactless credit and debit cards currently in 
circulation in the UK.  This paper presents a plausible attack scenario which exploits 
contactless verify PIN to give unlimited attempts to guess the cardholder’s PIN with-
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ability of the attack as well as references to support our argument that contactless ver-
ify PIN is redundant functionality which compromises the security of payment cards 
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1 Introduction 
The EMV
1
 specifications [5][6] control the operation of 1.5 billion of payment cards and 
21 million of Point of Sale terminals worldwide [15].  EMV payments can be contact trans-
actions commonly termed Chip & PIN or contactless transactions also known as Near Field 
Communication (NFC). 
Contact payments require the cardholder to insert their card into the Point of Sale termi-
nal and enter their PIN to authorise the transaction.  Contact transactions can be any value 
up to the card limit or available balance on the card.  Contactless payments are designed to 
be a convenient way to pay for low value transactions (currently up to £20 per transaction in 
the UK) with a card rather than cash.  Designed to be faster than a traditional Chip & PIN 
transaction, the card is simply placed in close proximity (approximately 4cm) to the Point of 
Sale terminal to authorise the payment, PIN entry is not required. 
In the UK the EMV specification for contact transactions supports PIN verification lo-
cally by the card (offline) and PIN verification remotely by the bank’s computers (online).  
The specifications for contactless transactions specifically exclude the use of offline PIN 
verification (full details in [6] Book A section 5.9.3 and [10] section 2.4 point 5).  Contact-
                                                          
1 Europay, MasterCard, Visa is a collaboration between Visa, MasterCard, American Express and JCB 
to create an interoperable card payment system.  
less offline PIN verification requires the PIN to be transmitted wirelessly to the card which 
poses a security risk from eavesdropping. 
The EMV specification only permits PIN entry in contactless transactions made using 
NFC enabled mobile devices.  PIN entry is not permitted for contactless card transactions.  
Mobile device payments are controlled by Consumer Device CVM
2
 rules, which permit 
online PIN verification, but not offline PIN (full details in [6] Book C3 sections 2.1 and 5.7). 
This paper examines the security implications of the verify PIN functionality intended for 
Chip & PIN operation also being available over the contactless interface, where it can be 
accessed without the cardholder’s knowledge or consent.  Surprisingly many of the contact-
less cards currently in circulation in the UK allow access to offline verify PIN. 
The attack scenario presented draws upon research carried out into the predictability of 
PINs [2] which shows that there is a subset of PINs that are much more commonly used; 
meaning guesses from this subset are much more likely to be successful. 
The implementation work builds upon related investigations into the vulnerability of 
EMV contactless payment cards to various attacks, such as skimming [7][8] and transaction 
relay [4][9].  These papers show that the wireless interface makes contactless payment cards 
vulnerable to new modes of attack that were not present in Chip & PIN.  Other research 
[3][11] show that the EMV protocol sequence can be manipulated to produce erroneous 
behaviour in the cards and the Point of Sale terminals. 
In what follows, we first introduce the attack scenario then the technology used and fi-
nally the performance results demonstrating the practicality of the attack.  A critical part of 
our software implementation is the ability to find and attack EMV payment cards contained 
in a wallet with various other contactless cards.  Our software implements the ISO-14443 
part 3 protocol sequence for card initialisation and anti-collision.  It can identify multiple 
cards, select each card in turn and communicate with each card once selected. 
2 Attack Scenario 
The attack scenario outlined in this paper is presented as supporting evidence of our as-
sertion that allowing contactless access to offline verify PIN represents a tangible threat to a 
large number of EMV payment cards currently in circulation in the UK.   
Newcastle University, like many other companies and institutions, uses NFC enabled 
identity cards to control access to our buildings.  When entering the building, many of us 
place our whole wallet on the door access reader as it is quicker and easier than taking the 
access card out of the wallet.  This gives an attacker the opportunity to access the other 
cards in the wallet, communicating with any contactless payment cards also present. 
Given that the person will enter the building on a regular basis and that the number of 
available PIN attempts is reset each time the payment card is used in a Point of Sale terminal 
or ATM, the attacker can have unlimited attempts to guess a card’s PIN. 
In our experimental implementation of the attack scenario we make use of (i) a protocol 
sequence which exploits the verify PIN functionality (ii) the ability to access multiple cards 
in a single wallet presented to the door access reader (iii) a strategy for guessing PINs [2] 
which will yield greatest number of correct guesses. 
                                                          
2 Cardholder Verification Method is used to approve the transaction either by PIN or by signature. 
2.1 PIN Verify Protocol Sequence 
CardNFC Reader
ListAvailableNFCApplications()
List of available applications
SelectApplication(AID)
Processing Data Options List / PDOL
VerifyPIN (PIN Guess)
PIN Correct
[ while PIN attempts remaining > 1 ]Loop
ChooseApplication()
GetData(PIN Attempts)
PIN Attempts Remaining
PIN Incorrect - ‘n’ attempts remaining
EncipherPIN(Guess)
GetChallenge ()
Card Unpredictable Number
 
Fig 1 - Verify PIN protocol sequence 
The full protocol sequence (Fig 1) is designed to guess the PIN without locking the card. 
Locking occurs when all of the available PIN attempts are used (i.e. the card is locked when  
the counter for PIN attempts remaining becomes zero).  The protocol uses the minimum 
number of commands possible so that it can be completed quickly (<500ms) to avoid arous-
ing the suspicions of the cardholder. Moreover, to avoid locking the card we need to keep at 
least one PIN attempt remaining on the card.  The protocol sequence is therefore limited to a 
maximum of two guesses each time the cardholder uses the door.  However, over time the 
attack has multiple chances to run the protocol sequence as the person will regularly return 
to the door access reader and each time the card is used in a Point of Sale terminal or ATM, 
the PIN attempt counter is reset, giving more chances for further guesses. 
The PIN verify protocol sequence described above ensures that at least one PIN attempt 
is left on the card. However the logic can be changed to create a nuisance attack which 
wipes out all of the available PIN attempts on all of the EMV payment cards in the wallet.  
This would not yield any financial gain, but there are many malicious attacks performed 
purely for the nuisance value.  A card that has zero PIN attempts remaining cannot be reac-
tivated at the Point of Sale terminal and the cardholder must to go to a bank ATM. 
2.2 Reading Multiple Cards 
The scenario requires reader software capable of distinguishing between multiple NFC 
cards in a wallet, allowing it to locate the EMV payment cards (implementation details can 
be found in section 3.2).  This also gives the potential to look for additional data such as the 
cardholder’s birthday on the other cards in the wallet, such as loyalty cards which may hold 
personal data unencrypted.  Bonneau et al. [2] shows that knowing the person’s birthday 
increases the chances of guessing their PIN within 6 guesses from 1.94% to 8.23%. 
2.3 PIN Guessing Strategy 
The attack scenario presented accesses the card each time the cardholder enters the build-
ing.  This gives it potentially unlimited guesses at the PIN over time, two guesses each time 
the door access is used.  Bonneau et al. [2] presents a survey containing a study of 1,351 
respondents, 805 of which detailed the respondents’ choice of PIN and their reason for 
choosing it.  The survey shows that 23% of respondents chose a memorable date (birthday 
and anniversary) as their PIN.  The paper goes further and identifies a list of PINs which are 
statistically more likely; using this list, the paper calculates that given 6 guesses, the chance 
of correctly guessing the PIN is 1.94%, which rises to 8.23% if the birthday of the card-
holder is known.  This research is backed up by a recent news story [14] where a burglar 
stole a wallet in which he found a driving licence and two ATM cards, he correctly guessed 
the PIN from the date of birth on the driving licence and was able to obtain £1,000 from a 
nearby ATM. 
3 Software Implementation 
The experimental work in preparing this paper includes (i) an implementation of the ver-
ify PIN protocol sequence which makes multiple attempts to guess the PIN of any EMV 
payment card detected in the wallet (ii) a multiple card reader implementation which will 
identify and communicate with all of the contactless cards in the wallet. 
The experiments were performed using an ACR122-U contactless card reader [1] and the 
Java™ Smart Card I/O API [13]. 
3.1 Verify PIN Implementation 
The UML sequence diagram (Fig 1) illustrates the protocol sequence required to perform 
the verify PIN attack sequence.  The sequence employs the minimum number of commands 
which achieve two contactless verify PIN attempts, this minimises total execution time (on 
average 457.2ms) for the sequence.  Minimising execution time is important to ensure that 
the attack is not easily detected by the cardholders using the door access. 
The protocol sequence is initiated when the multiple card reader (section 3.2) detects an 
EMV payment card in the wallet.  The protocol sequence therefore starts with the EMV 
payment card in the active state ready to accept commands (see Table 1 for a full explana-
tion of the possible card states).  Once the reader has established communication with the 
card, it reads the number of PIN attempts remaining using GetData(PIN Attempts).  It 
then calls the verify PIN command in a loop.  The card responds with 0x9000 if the PIN is 
correct or 0x63Cn if the PIN is incorrect, where ‘n’ is the number of PIN attempts remain-
ing.  The loop is repeated until the correct PIN is guessed or only one PIN attempt remains. 
We observed that the contactless PIN is the same as the contact PIN, this was confirmed 
by changing the card’s contact PIN using an ATM and verifying that the contactless PIN 
had also changed. 
3.2 Multiple Card Reader Implementation 
EMV contactless payment cards are compliant with the ISO-14443:Part 3 which defines 
the disambiguation and activation sequence.  Disambiguation involves obtaining the Unique 
Identifiers (UID) of each of the cards in the NFC field.  Once this is complete, the UID is 
used to activate each card individually.  The card is then ready to accept commands.  For 
successful communication only one card can be active at any one time. Table 1 below 
describes the transitions between the different states idle, ready, active and halt 
which allow the reader to successfully communicate with an individual card when there are 
multiple cards in the field. 
 
Table 1. ISO-14443 Card State Transitions 
State Description 
idle Upon entry to the NFC field all cards will power up into the idle state. 
ready The reader transmits REQA / WUPA command putting the cards into the ready 
state. Once all of the cards are in the ready state the anti-collision loop se-
quence can begin. 
active The anti-collision loop sequence is an iterative process used by the NFC 
reader to find the UID of the next card in the field.  The anti-collision com-
mand is repeatedly sent to all cards until only one card answers with a com-
plete UID and no collisions.  The UID is then used in the Select command 
which moves that card into the active state.  At this point the reader can 
communicate with the card using the card type specific protocol (EMV, 
MIFARE etc.) or instruct the card to halt and store the UID for future use. 
halt To communicate with the next card in the NFC field the reader must halt the 
currently active card.  Cards can be re-awakened from the halt state using 
the WUPA. 
 
The process of communicating with multiple cards is as follows: 
1. the anti-collision loop finds the UID of each card in turn  
2. Select(UID) moves the card with the given UID into the active state  
3. the active card is now ready for communication with the reader, only one card at 
a time can be active 
4. halt is used to stop communicating with the card and move to the next card 
The current implementation of the disambiguation and activation sequence is compatible 
with all ISO-14443:Part 3 compliant cards.  Once disambiguation is complete each card type 
has its own specific communication protocol.  We have implemented protocol sequences for 
three commonly available card types: EMV payment cards, MIFARE classic door access 
cards and MIFARE DESFire travel pass cards.  Communication with the implemented card 
types is not affected if an unknown card type is also present in the NFC field, the unknown 
card type is simply ignored once the disambiguation process has identified its UID.  The 
software utilises hardware commands specific to the NXP PN532 chipset [12] to perform 
the anti-collision loop, disambiguation and card selection. 
4 Results 
The test results in this section focus on the time taken to perform each of the steps in-
volved in performing the attack scenario presented in section 2.  These results are presented 
to support our assertion that the delay introduced by the attack would not arouse the suspi-
cions of the users of the door access system. 
4.1 Verify PIN protocol sequence 
Based on the data obtained in our tests the average time taken to perform the complete 
protocol sequence (Fig 1) was only 457.2ms; thereby strengthening the case that the door 
access reader attack scenario can be implemented without raising the suspicions of the users 
of the door access system. 
The time taken to perform each of the commands in the verify PIN protocol sequence is 
detailed in Table 2, which shows the average time and standard deviation calculated from 20 
test runs performed using EMV payment cards issued by a UK bank. 
 
Table 2. Verify PIN command execution times 
Command average (ms) standard deviation (sec) 
ListAvailableNFCApplications() 18.4 12.7 
SelectApplication(AID) 19.2 5.5 
GetData(PIN attempts) 29.8 17.9 
GetChallenge() 24.6 7.0 
VerifyPIN(incorrect PIN) 175.8 7.2 
GetChallenge() 12.2 6.8 
VerifyPIN(correct PIN) 177.2 9.6 
Complete Protocol Sequence 457.2 24.9 
 
The results show that 77.2% of the total time was taken by the card responding to the 
VerifyPIN() command.  It is also interesting to note that there is no significant difference 
between a correct PIN (177.2ms) and an incorrect PIN (175.8ms). 
4.2 Multiple Card Identification 
For the multiple card identification tests we used three of the more popular contactless 
card types: EMV payment cards, MIFARE classic door access cards and MIFARE DESFire 
travel pass cards.  The test results in Table 3 show the average time (over 60 test runs) to 
identify each card, when there are multiple cards in the NFC field.  Results of the tests show 
the identification of each card takes longer when more cards are in the field. 
 
Table 3. Multiple Card Identification Times 
Cards in NFC Field 2 cards 3 cards 4 cards 5 cards 
Identification of Each Card (ms) 214.36 285.82 305.95 358.30 
Standard Deviation (ms) 16.91 16.66 72.54 53.87 
 
The maximum number of cards that the ACR-122U reader (used in our tests) can identify 
in the NFC field varies by card type.  Table 4 shows the maximum number of each card type 
that the reader could identify and communicate with.  The first three rows show tests with a 
single card type in the NFC field.  The following three rows represent wallets containing a 
mixture of card types, with at least one EMV payment card and one MIFARE classic door 
access card (as the attack scenario described is based on wallets containing these two cards). 
 
Table 4. Maximum Cards in NFC field 
 EMV payment  MIFARE classic  MIFARE DESFire 
 2 cards   
Single card type  5 cards  
   4 cards 
 2 cards 1 card  
Multiple card types  1 card 1 card 1 card 
 1 card 3 cards  
4.3 Total Attack Time 
Table 5 illustrates the total time taken by the verify PIN attack on two example wallets: 
wallet 1 containing one MIFARE classic door access card and one EMV payment card; and 
wallet 2 containing one MIFARE classic, one EMV and one MIFARE DESFire travel pass.  
The complete sequence identifies all of the cards present in the wallet and then performs two 
PIN guesses on the EMV payment card. 
 
Table 5. Multiple Card Identification and Communication Time 
Scenario Identify Card (ms) Communication (ms) Total (ms) 
wallet 1 428.73 457.20 855.93 
wallet 2 643.09 457.20 1070.29 
 
In summary, the test results (Table 3) show that it is possible to attack a wallet containing 
multiple card types.  Moreover, Table 5 shows that for both wallet 1 and wallet 2, the total 
attack time of around 1 second is fast enough to avoid detection by the cardholder. 
5 Conclusion 
The attack scenario described in this paper exploits contactless verify PIN to give poten-
tially unlimited attempts to guess the cardholder’s PIN without their knowledge.  The im-
plementation work has successfully built and tested software that proves this attack scenario 
is technically viable.  The timing tests prove that the attack protocol sequence can be per-
formed in less than 1 second (wallet 1), making it possible to access the payment cards in 
the wallet without arousing the suspicions of the cardholder.  In the suggested scenario the 
attack protocol sequence can access a victim’s card multiple times over a number of days, 
this significantly increases the odds that the attack will guess their PIN correctly.  
It is our assertion that the attack scenario and experimental implementation work pre-
sented in this paper make a compelling case that contactless verify PIN can be misused to 
find out the PIN of the card without the knowledge of the cardholder. This significantly 
impacts the underlying security assumption of the Chip & PIN payment system, that an 
attacker can only gain knowledge of the cardholder’s PIN through the negligence or collabo-
ration of the cardholder. Moreover, offline verify PIN is not required in the processing of 
contactless transactions and is therefore redundant functionality. These findings suggest that 
it would be prudent to remove the contactless verify PIN functionality.  It may also help if 
cardholders are educated about the risks of placing their whole wallet on a contactless reader 
rather than removing the card from the wallet prior to use. 
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